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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Latino population is on the cusp of a major generational change. For the 
past several decades its growth was fueled mostly  by immigration. Now, the 
extraordinary fertility rate of foreign-born Latinos living in the United States is 
fueling Hispanic population growth at a faster rate than the influx of new 
immigrants. Soon, the U.S. born children of those immigrants will expand the adult 
Latino population. This imminent development requires renewed attention to age-
old questions in the history of migration: Will the second generation do better than 
the first? How much advantage comes from being raised and educated in the new 
land? How well can the children of immigrants compete against contemporaries 
from non-immigrant families? This report begins to answer those questions by 
examining the way the different Latino generations perform in the labor market, 
focusing on the wages and employment of young adults. 
The data compiled and assessed here show that the different Latino 
generations—the immigrants and their U.S.-born offspring—play markedly different 
roles in the labor force, and they present dissimilar challenges and opportunities to 
employers and policy-makers. 
As teenagers and young adults, Latino immigrants work. Indeed they work 
more and earn more than anyone else in their age group including whites. But, this 
advantage is very temporary because immigrant youth are working full-time while 
their contemporaries are studying, and a lack of education and skills locks 
immigrants into the low-end of the labor market through adulthood. Thus, the 
American economy’s appetite for young, low-skilled immigrant labor inevitably 
produces a substantial supply of adult workers with minimal qualifications. So far, 
during times of economic growth this workforce has found ready employment, but 
the experience of both the 2001 and the 1990-91 recessions have also shown that 
they are among the first to be let go in a downturn. 
The portrait presented of the children of immigrants is more complex and more 
troubling. Many in the second generation are in school during their teens and early 
twenties, acquiring skills and education that boost their earnings in later life. But, 
they are also very vulnerable during this period. About a quarter of all second-
generation Latino youth both work and study at the same time. This is a measure of 
the extent to which pursuing and education beyond the age of 16 involves an 
economic sacrifice for the young of immigrant households. This data, combined 
with the exceptionally high unemployment rates experienced by second-generation 
Latino youth, has clear implications for the formulation of policy on student loans 
and other forms of financial aid. This generation holds out much promise, but the 
data reported here strongly suggest that it will need help to fully realize its 
potential. 
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U.S. labor market outcomes vary significantly according to the age of the 
worker.  Earnings rise and employment stabilizes with experience. So, for example, 
teen unemployment rates are often multiples of the rates experienced by middle-
aged adults. When it comes to Hispanics, labor market analysis must recognize the 
unique age structure of Latino generations. Working age Latino immigrants tend to 
be mature adults; about 1-in-10 is between the ages of 16 and 24. By contrast, 4-in-
10 working age second generation Latinos are between the critical ages of 16 and 
24, reflecting the native-born youth boom. Age sensitive labor market analysis 
reveals that the fortunes of the second generation of Latinos appear very different, 
depending upon whether we investigate outcomes for youth or focus on adults over 
the age of 25.  
Some of the key findings of this report include: 
• Beyond the age of 25, second generation Latinos clearly fare better than 
similar immigrant Latinos. They are paid better. Their rates of job-
holding are at least as high, and they experience similar unemployment 
rates.  
• By the time they reach prime working age—beyond 25 years-old--most 
second generation Latinos fare at least as well as African Americans, but 
their labor force outcomes are markedly worse than whites. 
• High levels of education seem to be a prerequisite for second generation 
Latinos to surpass parity with white earnings levels. Indeed, second 
generation Latinos with college degrees on average earn more than 
college-educated white prime-age workers.  
• For young adult Latinos under the age of 24, labor market well-being by 
generation is reversed. Foreign-born Latino teens who are new arrivals 
earn substantially more than second-generation Latino teens. In fact, 
foreign-born Latino teens are the highest paid workers in the teen labor 
market, earnings almost twice the amount earned by white and African 
American teens. This reflects the high work hours of immigrant Latino 
teens and their much greater attachment to the labor market. 
• Second generation Latino teens are paid less, experience higher 
unemployment, and have much lower rates of job-holding than recently 
arrived immigrant Latino teens. Fewer of them are in the labor market at 
all. Instead, many second generation Latino teens are engaged in what 
white and African Americans teens do: investing in their skills by 
pursuing formal schooling. Very few immigrant Latino teens who 
recently arrived in the U.S. are enrolled in school. Latino immigrants 
who arrived in the U.S. during childhood do not do as well as their U.S.-
born kin when they reach adulthood. While Latinos of generation 1.5 
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may have similar educational experiences to those of native-born 
Latinos, upon maturity their labor market outcomes are decidedly below 
second-generation Latino adults. In spite of many years of U.S. 
residence, “near-native Latinos” experience labor market difficulties 
associated with their immigrant status. 
 
 Overall, the data analyzed in this report present a mixed picture with about 
as many optimistic indicators as there are troubling ones. Clearly, when the U.S. 
economy is growing rapidly, as it did in the late 1990’s, the labor market affords 
extraordinary opportunities to immigrant youth. Even those with very little 
experience in the U.S. labor market can find steady work. When they are in their 
late teens, immigrant youth do better than the native born. This is a short-lived 
advantage, however. Wages for immigrant youth start low and stay low through 
adulthood. By age 25, second generation Latinos eclipse their immigrant 
counterparts. Lacking exposure to U.S. schools, the immigrants’ narrow focus on 
the employment world puts them on a sub par earnings path relative to second-
generation teens. Meanwhile, the schooling endeavors of second-generation teens 
likely will reap larger labor market payoffs later in life because rates of return to 
educational attainment are substantial for native-born Latinos. 
 In terms of generational advancement and the broad question of whether 
the second generation will go farther than the first, the news is good. There are 
strong indications that most of the U.S. born children of Latino immigrants will 
move beyond the life of working-class poverty that is typical of both their parents 
and their foreign-born contemporaries. This analysis finds a substantial movement 
forward from the first generation to the second, but it also finds that this 
movement forward is not nearly powerful enough to bring the second generation to 
parity with white workers. Over the next several decades, as the second generation 
takes its place in the labor market, the overall economic status of the Latino 
population is likely to improve. And, this new cohort of workers will probably fill 
different jobs than their immigrant forbearers, jobs that pay more for greater skills 
or education and a greater mastery of English. But, this large and growing second 
generation, even though it is native born and the product of U.S. schools, seems 
likely to fall short of enjoying the kind of employment and the standard of living 
that most white Americans take for granted.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Latino labor force is experiencing a major generational shift as 
increasing numbers of today’s young native-born Latino Americans become 
workers. The fabled baby boom of the 1950s fueled the rapid growth of the white 
and African American populations. Now, decades later, the number of youthful 
non-Hispanics is declining while aging baby boomers continue to dominate the 
labor force. Sizable increases in Latino immigration in the 1970s fueled a rise of first 
generation workers and now the children of these immigrants are beginning to 
enter the labor market. In an upcoming report the Pew Hispanic Center will offer a 
detailed examination of the demographic changes that will reshape the U.S. labor 
force over the next two decades. This report describes the wage, employment 
outcomes, and labor market attachment of Latino adults by age and generation 
during the economic expansion of the late 1990s.   
This report’s key contribution is generational; comparisons by age that show 
that generational outcomes vary strongly by age. The behavior of teens and young 
adults diverges sharply from adults over the age of 25. The teenage years appear to 
be a critical period for Latino youth as they make very important choices on 
working full-time versus part-time and whether to pursue schooling or not. Of 
course it is impossible to predict with certainty how the youth of today will perform 
as adults in the future, but the available data suggest that these teen outcomes and 
choices have long-term implications for educational attainment, earnings, and 
overall labor market success. For example, foreign-born Latino teens are very 
successful in the U.S. labor market relative to their native-born peers, but their teen 
success likely comes at a very high price in term of long-term labor market 
opportunity. 
The report opens with a review of Latino unemployment experience during 
the late 1990’s economic expansion to show the importance of age for generational 
analysis. The data source for the analysis is then briefly described. To contrast teen 
and young adult outcomes, we provide an overview of labor market trends and 
outcomes for prime-age workers. Substantially different outcomes are apparent 
among Latino 16-to-19 year-olds depending on their nativity, and thus we focus on 
the activities pursued by Latino teens across generations and in comparison to 
white and black youth. Since Latino immigrant and native-born youth are pursuing 
radically different activities, we gauge the long-term labor market implications of 
these youth behavior and outcomes. 
      
GENERATIONS AND THE YOUTH EFFECT 
Along with most U.S. workers, Latinos improved their labor market standing 
during the latter 1990s, in terms of more employed, declining unemployment rates, 
and increases in earnings. After a long period of recovery following the recession of 
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1990-1991, all working-age Latinos saw increases in their labor force participation 
rates and significant drops in unemployment from 1995 to 2000.  
But clear differences stood out among the four generational groups of 
Latinos at work in the U.S. today (see box), especially when contrasting young 
workers (16 to 24 years old) and prime age (25 to 66 years old) labor force 
participants: 
 
• The 1.0 generation is the foreign born who arrived as adults. 
• The 1.5 generation is the foreign born who arrived as pre-teens. 
• The 2nd generation is the native born with at least one immigrant parent. 
• The 3rd+ generation is the native born with two native-born parents. 
 
The immigrant first and 1.5 generations experienced the strongest 
improvements in labor force participation and the greatest declines in 
unemployment over the 1995 to 2000 period (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the 
third-plus generation remained 
better off in terms of these 
indicators than the other 
generations but experienced less 
overall improvement from its 
higher baseline. Unemployment 
rates declined strikingly for the first 
generation from over 9 to 5 
percent, while the third-plus 
generation unemployment fell 
from nearly 8 percent to just over 
5. Immigrants saw their labor force 
participation rates rise by over 4 
percentage points, while the third 
generation saw a 1 percentage 
point increase in participation 
rates.   
Yet, the second generation had 
the lowest labor force participation 
rates and the highest unemployment rates in either 1995 or 2000. They carried this 
unenviable status into the recession of 2001 when unemployment rates soared at 
times to more than 10 percent, spikes not experienced by the other generations 
(Suro and Lowell, 2002). The most obvious explanation for the greater job losses 
among second-generation workers is their youth. Lacking seniority, younger 
workers typically are hurt badly in recessions. The average age of the second 
Figure 1. Unemployment of All 
Latino Workers by Generation
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generation was only 19 in 2001 while immigrants averaged about 37 years of age. 
Nearly 4-out-of-10 of second-generation Latino adults are young adults less than 25 
years of age. By contrast, only 1-in-7 of first generation adults are teens and young 
adults.  
Age differences drive much of the variation among Latino generations. Nowhere 
is this more evident than for the second generation. The second generation total 
employment figures are strongly affected by their youthful age composition. 
Generational averages mask strong age effects (see Table 1). Teens and young adults 
experience the highest rates of unemployment, and because they are a much larger 
share of the second generation than of the first, the youth effect causes much of its 
higher unemployment rate. In fact, if teens and young adults are taken out of 
consideration, the second generation actually has unemployment rates that are 
below the Latino average and are also below the rate for first generation’s prime age 
workers. 
So, in sum, to understand how generations are faring, we need to look carefully 
at teens and young adults as compared to the prime working age population. 
Generational outcomes can be markedly different once age is taken into account. 
While the second generation’s average suggests they are not doing as well as 
immigrants, this is the case only for the youth. Among prime-age adults, second-
generation employment rates and labor market attachment are at least as high as 
the first generation’s and their earnings, on average, are far superior to the 
immigrant generation’s earnings levels.  
 
DATA FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 
This analysis is based on our tabulations of the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Each month the Census Bureau 
administers the survey to a scientifically selected sample of about 50,000 
households. The CPS is a primary source of information on the earnings and 
employment of the nation’s adults and the state of the nation’s labor market. It 
Table 1. Unemployment Rates by Latino Generation and 
Age Group, 2000 (in %)
All
Ages Latinos 1.0 1.5 2nd 3rd+
16 - 66 5.7 5.0 6.0 7.8 5.3
16 - 19 15.9 14.2 11.2 20.5 14.7
20 - 24 7.9 6.0 6.7 9.9 8.8
25 - 44 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.2 4.2
45 - 66 3.9 4.7 3.9 3.1 2.4
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation
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provides the basis for the official estimates of the nation’s monthly unemployment 
rate released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Each month, the CPS asks detailed earnings and job characteristic questions to 
one quarter of the sample (the “outgoing rotation group”). For the purposes of 
examining the labor market outcomes of minority populations, any one monthly 
CPS outgoing rotation group will lack sufficient sample size. In order to overcome 
the limitation of the monthly samples, a calendar year’s worth of outgoing rotation 
groups data have been added together into one data file, and it is these merged 
outgoing rotation group files that we use for our analysis. This means that our CPS 
sample is three times as large as the typical monthly CPS and gives us better 
estimates for Latinos (see Appendix A for further details on the CPS data). Unlike 
the decennial Census or the American Community Survey, the CPS asks 
respondents to state both parents’ country of birth and their own country of birth. 
A NOTE ON CLASSIFYING GENERATIONS 
There is nearly universal agreement on the definition of foreign-born, first 
generation immigrants compared with native-born generation Americans 
(sometimes referred to as second and higher, see Oropesa and Landale, 1997). 
Starting with the foreign-born generation, the younger an immigrant arrives, the 
earlier they begin to learn the skills that help them succeed (Friedberg 1991). We 
focus here on early versus late arrival immigrants dividing them into the: 
• 1.0 Generation—these are immigrants born outside the U.S. or its territories 
and whose estimated arrival in the U.S. occurred after 13 years of age. We 
choose age 13 as the age for late arrival because research suggests individuals 
who arrive as teens tend not to complete school as often as younger arrivals. 
• 1.5 Generation—these are also immigrants born abroad and whose arrival in 
the U.S. occurred before 13 years of age inclusive. These one-and-one-half 
generation immigrants are early or child arrivals.  
Some researchers go further dividing the immigrant generation into 1.25, 1.5, 
and 1.75 depending upon age of arrival (Rumbaut, 1997). We prefer to keep the 
analysis simple, recognizing that there is a gradation of outcomes depending on 
age at arrival. Age 13 is a critical divide as immigrants who arrive by the eighth 
grade complete school at the same rate as natives (NCES, 1998).  
The native-born, in turn, are typically broken into at least two major 
generational groups: 
• 2nd Generation—refers to U.S. native-born persons with at least one parent 
who is an immigrant born abroad.  
• 3rd+ Generation—these are U.S. native-born persons whose mother and 
father were both born in the U.S. 
To be sure, these generational breaks among the native-born population are 
to some degree based on data availability and it is possible that the “4th” or even 
“5th” generation experiences different outcomes. But there is a long tradition of 
seeing the 2.0 or second generation as being more strongly influenced by their 
immigrant heritage than is the third generation.  
We classified individuals born on the island of Puerto Rico as “foreign-born” 
in this analysis. 
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This enables us to identify persons that are in the second generation separately 
from other native-born individuals. Appendix B includes several tables that 
elaborate on the basic findings discussed below. 
   The choice of 1995 and 2000 as starting and closing points for our analysis was 
dictated by both labor market considerations and data constraints. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research officially dated the most recent recession as 
commencing in March 2001. On an annual basis, 2000 was likely a cyclical peak for 
the U.S. economy based on employment and real wage levels. In regard to the 
starting point for the analysis, real wage levels turned up for low wage workers 
beginning in 1993 (Economic Report of the President, 1999). Ideally, we would 
have liked to examine the cyclical path of Latino labor market outcomes prior to 
1995. Unfortunately, adequate data on labor market outcomes by generation is not 
available prior to 1995. 
 
ADULTS—SECOND GENERATION LABOR MARKET ADVANTAGE  
Native-born Latinos enjoy a distinct advantage in labor market outcomes over 
their immigrant counterparts among prime working age adults aged 25 and older. 
Over the course of the late 1990s, this is clearly evident in employment outcomes, 
as well as in earnings. Although Latino native adults do better than immigrants, 
they do not fare as well as non-Hispanic whites. 
 
Gains in Adult Employment From 
1995 to 2000 
       Second-generation Latino 
prime-age adults are more likely to 
find and keep employment than 
their immigrant counterparts. In 
some instances, the difference in 
second generation and first 
generation job holding can be quite 
large. In 2000, for example, 45 
percent of island-born, first -
generation Puerto Rican 45-to-66 
year olds held employment. 
Meanwhile, about 61 percent of 
second-generation, mainland-born 
Puerto Rican 45-to-66 year olds held 
jobs in 2000.  
      
Figure 2. Employment-to-
Population Ratios by Latino 
Generation, Adults ages 25 - 44
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It is important to define benchmarks for the levels and progress of the Latino 
labor force by comparing Latino outcomes to those of other non-Latino persons. 
Prime-age second-generation Latinos land jobs at rates equal to or exceeding their 
African-American counterparts but slightly lag similarly aged whites. In 2000, about 
63 percent of African American 45-to-66 year olds found employment. Sixty-six 
percent of similarly aged Mexican second generation persons and 61 percent of 
second generation mainland-born Puerto Ricans held jobs. By contrast, 70 percent 
of white 45-to-66 year olds held jobs in 2000. 
Latino adults benefited from the job expansion of the late 1990s, even more 
than African American adults. Latinos ages 45-to-66 in particular had very large 
employment gains. Job-holding by blacks in this age group increased by just 4 
percentage points. Latino employment rates increased by nearly 10 percentage 
points, and the gains were widespread, experienced by second generation Latinos as 
well as immigrants. For example, among 45-to-66 year olds of Mexican descent, 
employment shot up from 53 percent to 63 percent of the population among 
Mexican immigrants and from 55 percent to 66 percent for second-generation 
Mexicans in that age range. 
 
Earnings Growth and the Late 1990s Economic Expansion 
Economic expansions do not necessarily lift all boats equally. The 1990s 
expansion is noteworthy in that it benefited low wage workers as well higher skilled 
workers. Strong employment 
growth and declining 
unemployment translated into 
strong growth in real wages for 
most workers during 1995 to 2000 
including low wage workers and 
Latinos. The gains experienced 
since 1993 were the first real wage 
gains for lower wage workers since 
the late 1970s (Economic Report of 
the President, 1999). Latino 
workers experienced significant 
wage growth over the 1995 to 
2000 period, keeping up with the 
gains experienced by white 
workers. Even though the Latino 
workforce as a whole continued to 
earn far less, the earnings gap 
between white and Latino workers 
Figure 3. Median Weekly Earnings 
of Latino Adults, Ages 25-44
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did not widen during the expansion. Average wages grew similarly for both Latino 
and white workers from 1995 to 2000.  
       For all Latino workers, the real median weekly wage rose from $337 per week in 
1995 to $360 per week in 2000. White median wages rose from $496 per week to 
$541 per week. The one notable exception to the pattern of general wage expansion 
for Latino workers is among Puerto Rican workers. Average wages for Puerto Ricans 
were flat over the 1995 to 2000 period. For example, for 25-to- 44 year old second-
generation, mainland-born Puerto Ricans, median wages fell from $505 per week to 
$500 per week. 
Among prime-age workers, second generation Latino wages are without 
exception above those for comparable first generation Latino workers. For example, 
among 25-to-44 year old workers in 2000, median wages were $480, $550 and $500 
for second-generation Mexican, Central and South American, and Puerto Rican 
workers. Median wages for their first generation counterparts were $323, $360, and 
$400, respectively. The second generation has a sizable wage advantage over first 
generation workers among prime aged individuals.  
Interracial wage patterns are similar to the employment outcomes noted above. 
Second-generation, prime -aged Latino workers tend to earn more than African 
American workers, but not without exception. In 2000, the median wage for 
Mexican second generation 45-to-66 year old workers was $480 per week, the same 
as the median wage for 45-to-66 year old African Americans. Among prime-age 
workers, second generation Latino wages clearly fell below white wages. Among 25-
to-44 year old second-generation workers, Central and South American were the 
highest paid in 2000, with median weekly wages of $550 per week. White 25-to-44 
year olds, by contrast, were paid $600 per week in 2000. 
Unfortunately, our analysis precluded a detailed examination of generational 
outcomes for Latinos of Cuban descent: these native born may do as well or better 
in the labor market as whites (Bean et al., 2001). Similarly, highly educated U.S. 
born female Hispanic workers may have earnings on par with similar female whites 
(Reimers, 2000).1 With these possible exceptions, native-born Latinos do not earn as 
much in today’s labor market as non-Hispanic whites. 
While it is encouraging that Latino wage growth has been at least as strong as 
that of whites, a marked differential still remains. Many analyses of Latino earnings 
note the large schooling gap between native-born Latino and white workers and 
find that education explains a substantial portion of the earnings differential.  
                                                 
1 Reimers (2000) tabulates median weekly earnings for full-time U.S.-borne Latinas versus whites. For 
1996, median earnings are $262, $400, and $730 per week for U.S.-born Latinas (between the ages of 35 to 
64) lacking a high school diploma, with a high school diploma or some college, and for those with at least a 
bachelor’s degree, respectively. Comparable figures for U.S.-born white women are $294, $423, and $730, 
respectively. 
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Simple tabulations reveal that education alone cannot account for the entire 
earnings differential between prime-age whites and Latinos. Within most age and 
education groups, second generation prime-age adult Latinos earn more than 
similarly educated African American workers (see Table 2). Yet, in most age and 
education groups, white workers have a significant earnings advantage over second 
generation Latinos. A noteworthy exception is the much smaller earnings gap 
among older and better educated second generation Latinos. In fact, second 
generation Latino college graduates ages 45-66 earn 12 percent more than their 
white college-educated counterparts. Education goes a long way toward explaining 
the persistent gap in earnings between Latinos and whites, but it does not explain it 
completely.  
 
Third Generation Plus Adult Latinos: A Mixed Picture Compared to the Second 
Generation 
Among persons 25 years of age and older, second generation Latinos are paid 
more and have higher rates of job-holding than the first generation. But if the 
second generation does better than their immigrant forbears, there is not a strong 
continuation of this trend into the even more assimilated third-plus generation. 
Indicators of labor market attachment reveal that third-plus generation Latino 
prime-age adults are relatively successful in the labor market.  Their unemployment 
rate is close to the non-Hispanic white rate (see Table 1). Their job holding rate lags 
that of non-Hispanic whites, but is equal to or surpasses the second generation 
Latino rate. 
Measures of educational attainment and weekly earnings reveal that there is 
little apparent progress between the second and third-plus generation of Latino 
adults. Trejo (1997) shows that Mexican American wages are flat between the 
Table 2. Median Weekly Earnings by Education for Adults, 2000 (in $)
Did not 
complete High
high school Some College
school diploma college graduate
Ages 25 - 44
2nd generation Latinos 350 450 505 769
Non-Hispanic Blacks 310 400 480 692
Non-Hispanic Whites 390 490 560 826
Ages 45 - 66
2nd generation Latinos 300 490 520 1080
Non-Hispanic Blacks 320 420 519 775
Non-Hispanic Whites 370 500 600 961
Source: Current Population Survey 
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second and third and higher generations. Among prime-age adults, education and 
earnings growth seem to stall after the second generation (see Table 3). Rates of 
high school completion do not seem markedly higher for native-born Latinos with 
native-born parents than for the second generation and still fall significantly below 
white rates. Also, college attendance does not improve between the second and 
third-plus generations. In fact, there is little earnings advantage for the third-plus 
over the second generation: Latino average earnings increase 22 percent from first 
to second, but not quite 5 percent from the second to the third-plus generation.  
 
TEENS—THE FIRST GENERATION EMPLOYMENT ADVANTAGE 
Among teens age 16-19 the first generation of Latinos fare much better in the 
labor market than their second-generation counterparts. Immigrant Latino teens 
outperform white teenagers on some key labor market indicators. First generation 
Latino teens are the most highly paid members of their age group in the labor 
market, earning more than either whites or blacks (see Figure 4). The median wage 
for Latino first generation teens was $260 per week in 2000, three quarters more 
Table 3: Educational Attainment and Earnings of Latino Prime-age Adults, 
3rd+ Generation Compared to 2nd Generation, 2000
Less than
High Some Median
School College Weekly
Completion Completion Earnings
Rate (in %) Rate (in %) (in $)
Ages 25 - 44
Mexicans
2nd generation 21.6 43.0 480
3rd+ generation 21.3 41.2 467
Central/south americans
2nd generation 8.8 67.3 550
3rd+ generation 14.7 51.2 560
Puerto Ricans
2nd generation 20.6 47.9 500
3rd+ generation 12.5 46.9 520
Ages 45 - 66
Mexicans
2nd generation 36.4 37.1 480
3rd+ generation 32.2 33.6 485
Source: Current Population Survey 
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than the $150 median wage paid 
to white and black teen workers. 
The 1.5 Latino generation teens 
average $209 per week while, in 
contrast, median wages for the 
second generation Latino teen is 
about $180 per week. The 
favorable earnings outcomes for 
first-generation Latino teens are 
also apparent in a variety of other 
labor market indicators (see Table 
4). Immigrant Latino teens have 
much lower unemployment rates 
than their second-generation peers. 
For example, among Mexican 
teens, first-generation teens had an 
unemployment rate of 11.4 
percent, in comparison to an 
unemployment rate of 21.8 
percent for Mexican second-generation teens in 2000. At the same time, the labor 
force participation rate of first-generation Mexican teens is 64 percent, compared to 
the white rate of 58 percent. 
 
Figure 4. Weekly Earnings for 
Teens, 2000
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Table 4: Labor Market Outcomes and Activities of 16-to-19 Year-olds, 2000
average
median employment unemploy- labor force full-time hours school
weekly to ment participation employment worked enrollment
earnings population rate rate status1 last status
(in 2000 $) ratio (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) week2 (in %)
All Latinos 203 38 15.9 45.7 16.2 29.8 60.5
NonHispanic Blacks 150 30 23.9 38.9 9.0 26.2 69.6
NonHispanic Whites 147 52 10.6 57.7 14.0 24.6 69.4
All Latinos 203 38 15.9 45.7 16.2 29.8 60.5
1.0 generation 260 50 14.2 58.7 38.0 38.0 23.2
1.5 generation 209 38 11.2 43.0 17.7 30.3 60.1
2nd generation 180 34 20.5 43.3 11.4 27.6 67.8
3rd+ generation 180 40 14.7 46.8 14.2 28.7 63.3
Mexicans 209 40 15.9 47.2 18.0 30.8 57.6
1.0 generation 260 57 11.4 64.1 44.0 39.0 14.1
1.5 generation 230 40 11.0 44.9 20.6 31.6 54.7
2nd generation 195 35 21.8 44.7 12.7 28.4 66.6
3rd+ generation 180 40 14.6 46.6 14.4 29.1 62.6
Source: Current Population Survey 
Notes: 1Percent of the population working full-time.
2Defined for those persons that worked at one or more jobs during the week before the interview.
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Immigrant Workers and Second Generation Students 
Relative to their native-born Latino counterparts, first-generation Latino teens, 
and to a lesser extent young adults, have radically better labor market outcomes. 
Much of this apparent success can be traced to the first generation’s different 
orientation toward work and education.  
Schooling is a subsidiary activity for immigrant Latino teens, whereas schooling, 
and not the labor market and the world of work, is the primary endeavor for most 
U.S. natives, Latino, African American and white. Thirty eight percent of immigrant 
Latino youth work full-time (more than 34 hours of work per week). The proportion 
is even higher for youth of Mexican descent. Forty-four percent of first-generation 
Mexican 16-to-19 year olds work full-time. Less than 13 percent of their second-
generation counterparts work full-time, similar to the 14 percent of white youth 
who work full-time and 9 percent of black youth who work full-time. Compared to 
their immigrant contemporaries, second-generation Latino youths are much more 
likely to be in school. Two-thirds of second-generation Mexican teens are enrolled 
in school (similar to the 70 percent of white and black youth). Only 14 percent of 
first-generation Mexican origin teens are enrolled in school.  
School and work are not mutually exclusive activities. Furthermore, the amount 
of time and energy that the teen devotes to them can vary. The Current Population 
Survey asks whether the respondent is pursuing school full-time versus part-time. 
Using this information, in combination with information on work intensity, youths 
Table 5. Detailed Activities of Mexican Origin 16-to-19 Year-Olds, 2000 (in %)
Activity 1.0 1.5 2nd 3rd+
Not in Labor Force:
not in labor force, not at school 25.4 14.4 11.6 12.5
not in labor force, school full-time 9.7 38.5 41.4 40.0
not in labor force, school part-time 0.9 2.3 2.3 0.9
Full Time Labor Force Participants:
work full-time, not at school 50.7 23.2 14.2 16.3
work full-time, school full-time 1.0 0.9 2.7 2.4
work full-time, school part-time 0.2 1.3 1.8 1.1
Part Time Labor Force Participants:
work part-time, not at school 9.9 7.7 7.7 8.7
work part-time, school full-time 2.4 10.1 15.0 16.6
work part-time, school part-time 0.0 1.7 3.4 1.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation
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can be placed into one of nine mutually exclusive school/labor force/work activity 
categories (see table 5). What is most striking is how rare it is for first-generation 
youth to be in school. The three most prevalent activities (accounting for over 85 
percent of Mexican first-generation teens) do not involve school at all. Mexican 
first-generation youth may be working or may be out of the labor force, but they 
are not attending school.  
By contrast, the key characteristic of Mexican second-generation youth is that 
they are not working full-time. In addition, many second-generation Mexican 
youths are going to school to some extent. While first-generation Latino teens are 
working rather than studying, second generation Latino youth juggle both. They 
avoid full-time work in favor of part-time employment or no employment at all, 
and are much more likely than their immigrant counterparts to be in school. 
 
TEENS TO ADULTS—THE SECOND GENERATION SURPASSES THE 
IMMIGRANT GENERATION 
Although second-generation youth display poorer labor market outcomes during 
the teenage years in comparison to their first-generation counterparts, in the long 
run, they typically benefit from their focus on schooling during their teenage years. 
Current estimated rates of return on education are substantial for all workers, 
including Latino workers (see Table 6).  
Latino high school graduates are paid at least 17 percent more than otherwise 
similar Latino high school dropouts. Latino college graduates are paid more than a 
third more than Latino high school graduates. These estimates are for Latinos of 
both foreign- and native-born generations. And econometric studies typically show 
Table 6. Estimated Minimum Payoff to Attaining 
Education (in %)
High School College Graduate
Graduate Compared Compared with High
with Dropout School Graduate
Hispanic Men 17.8 36.5
NonHispanic Men 23.2 35.9
Hispanic Women 16.5 36.2
NonHispanic Women 20.7 34.3
Source: Bradbury (2002)
Estimated Earnings Difference
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that the returns to education are greater for native-born adults than foreign-born 
adults. Hence, the returns to education are likely greater for native-born Latinos 
than these figures suggest (Trejo, 2001). 
   Tabulations from the Current Population Survey also suggest that second-
generation teenagers will likely come out far ahead of their foreign-born 
counterparts. We compare second-generation 25-to-44 year olds to other groups of 
25-to-44 year old workers. We are not entirely comfortable making judgments 
about how today’s youth are likely to fare in their prime-age adult years using 
inferences from a statistical snapshot. After all, today’s Latino youth will not reach 
midlife for another 15 years or so. But if today’s youth fare as well as today’s 25-to-
44 year adults are faring, then it is probable that second generation youth will come 
out far ahead of their first generation counterparts in adulthood. 
   Many first-generation Latinos in the 25-to-44 year-old range are recently arrived 
in the United States, so comparisons to second-generation Latinos of that age group 
are of limited value. It is more productive to compare generations that share more 
in common inside terms of exposure to the United States. Adult Latinos of the 1.5 
generation are immigrants, but by definition they arrived in this country by age 13. 
The average age-at-arrival of Latino 25-to-44 year olds in the 1.5 generation is 6.9 
years of age. So by age 25, the 1.5-generation has been here a long time, been 
Table 7.  Educational Attainment and Earnings of Latino 25-to-44 Year-olds,
 2nd Generation Compared to 1.5 Generation, 2000
Less than
High Some
School College median 
Completion Completion weekly earnings
Rate (in %) Rate (in %) (in $)
All Latinos
1.5 generation 38.3 33.2 400
2nd generation 19.0 48.8 500
Mexicans
1.5 generation 47.6 23.4 375
2nd generation 21.6 43.0 480
Central/south americans
1.5 generation 26.0 49.4 456
2nd generation 8.8 67.3 550
Puerto Ricans
1.5 generation 34.5 36.5 440
2nd generation 20.6 47.9 500
Source: Current Population Survey 
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exposed to U.S. schools, and had the benefit of exposure to U.S. norms, institutions, 
and language during their formative childhood years.2 
      By adulthood, second-generation Latinos are significantly ahead of their 
foreign-born 1.5-generation counterparts who have been in the U.S. for a long time 
(see table 7). Clearly, arriving in the United States at a young age does not assure 
that members of the 1.5-generation will attain the same rates of school completion 
as the second generation. The 1.5 generation acquires good English skills and 
knowledge of U.S. norms, and they do well when they do stay in school. But, they 
do not go on to complete as much education as the native born. This then carries 
over into their labor market profile as adults. 
Among prime-age adults of Mexican descent, about 20 percent of the second 
generation lacked a high school diploma (versus 7 percent of the comparable non-
Hispanic whites). But almost half of the Mexican adult 1. 5 generation had not 
finished high school. Second-generation Latinos are also significantly more likely to 
have gone on to college than their 1.5 counterparts. These investments in schooling 
tend to be rewarded in the labor market. The median pay of second-generation 
Latino prime-age adults substantially exceeds that of the 1.5 generation in prime-
age even though both are born of immigrants and the sole substantial differences 
between them are where they were born and where they spend their early 
childhood.3 
In short, the economic progress of first generation Latino teens appears confined 
to their early work life. By age 25, second generation Latinos are substantially ahead 
of their immigrant counterparts, including 1.5-generation immigrants who have 
been in the United States for a very long time. Immigrant Latino teens are focused 
on work and have little involvement with formal schooling. Second generation 
teens are more marginally attached to the labor market and are much more engaged 
with formal schooling. 
 
DISCUSSION OF GENERATIONAL OUTCOMES AND THE LITERATURE 
 Research on Latinos typically focuses either on children and their 
educational achievement, or adults and their success in the labor market. Because 
immigrants make up much of the Latino population, investigators’ have asked 
whether or not the foreign-born generation catches up with the native born. Our 
analysis points out that there are marked differences among teens and adults, even 
within generations defined by place of birth and age of arrival in the United States.  
                                                 
2A significant body of research finds that the 1.5 generation can actually outperform the 2nd generation in 
U.S. schools. They have higher GPAs than the second generation and apparently retain more of a drive to 
succeed in school than their native peers (Rumbaut, 1997). 
3 Some members of the 1.5 generation are unauthorized to work in the United States. Some research 
suggests that legal status does affect wages and working conditions.  
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Adult Labor Market Achievement 
 Research on the labor market has primarily focused on the experiences of 
adults. Most of it has examined males of Mexican origin and has compared the 
outcomes of immigrants to natives without distinguishing the characteristics and 
fortunes of the second generation from those of other native-born Latinos.  Data 
showing that foreign-born Mexicans earn considerably less than their U.S.-born 
counterparts supports the theory that assimilation improves wage outcomes (Padilla 
and Glick 2000). Second generation Mexicans are found to earn more than a third 
more than immigrant Mexicans. This wage growth is correlated with notably better 
educational attainment and English proficiency in the native generations. Third 
and later generation Mexicans do not earn significantly more than second 
generation workers (Trejo, 1997, 2001). Our research corroborates that the earnings 
of the third generation prime-age adult Latinos are not much greater than those of 
the second generation.  
 While this is clearly a story of generational advancement, with natives doing 
much better than immigrants, it is also a story of a seemingly partial success: the 
Latino second generation does no better than the third. If the process were simply 
linear, the third generation should do much better than the second generation, as it 
is even more established in the United States. Yet, in non-Latino groups, 
particularly among Asians and whites, the second generation actually does better 
than the third and later generation for reasons presumably having to do with a 
strong drive to pursue education and to make the best of the U.S. labor market. 
Immigrants are well known for their work ethic, and their children often mimic 
that sense of initiative in ways that help them capitalize on U.S. education and 
English proficiency.  
Research that does not make ethnic distinctions tends to find “other things 
being equal, being a child of immigrants is associated with greater socioeconomic 
success in the United States” (Card, Dinardo, and Estes 2000). Among all 
race/ethnicities, second generation workers earn 7 percent more than the third and 
higher generation workers (Borjas 1999). 
 So second-generation adult Latinos are quite successful relative to their 
immigrant Latino counterparts, but compared with other children of immigrants 
they are not as successful. Once again, the major cause is lower rates of high school 
and post-secondary education among Latinos as compared with Asian and white 
second generation workers. The full range of additional reasons is beyond the scope 
of the discussion here, but they include English fluency and labor market 
experience as Latinos are younger than most other U.S. workers. Furthermore, the 
Latino native generations do not earn as much as white workers which suggests a 
slow assimilation trajectory. Nevertheless, we have found, as have others, that 
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college-educated second generation Latinos actually earn more than white workers. 
Among those second generation Latinos who complete higher education there is 
the same drive to succeed that appears to be unique to second generation workers 
generally. 
 
Latino Youth and Educational Achievement 
 There has been significant interest in the fortunes of the children of 
immigrants and much of the analysis has concentrated on educational outcomes 
and school-age children and teens (Kao, 1999; Portes and MacLeod, 1996; Kao and 
Tienda, 1995; Driscoll, 1999). This body of research turns the usual story of “wage 
assimilation” on its head as immigrant children actually seem to do better 
educationally than the native born. Our findings that immigrants also do better in 
the labor market, during the teenage years, complements the educational research. 
But there is a twist to this story that has yet to be fully told. 
  In fact, our findings demonstrate that a majority of first and even many 1.5-
generation immigrant children do not complete high school (Table 7). Those who 
are doing well in the labor market during the ages of 16 to 19 are those who have 
abandoned schooling. They do well in the labor market in part because they have 
opted to work full time. The second generation labor market disadvantage during 
the teenage years is due, in turn, to the fact that the second generation is enrolled 
and completing high school at much higher rates than the first or 1.5 generations. 
As a result, during their teen years the second generation is loosely attached to the 
labor market and does not do as well as immigrants. In the long run, the second 
generation is able to capitalize on its education for better earnings than immigrants 
as adults (Table 7).  
 Clearly, the apparent labor market advantage of immigrant teens is not at all 
related to their purported educational advantage, nor is the apparent labor market 
disadvantage of the second generation during the teenage years persistent. What we 
are witnessing is investment by some teens (immigrants) in the labor market and in 
schooling by other teens (natives). Of course, this raises the question of why 1.5 
generation educational achievements do not also carry over into adulthood. The 
answer may well be that not only are there two courses of action, there may be two 
different populations of immigrant and native teens with distinct characteristics, 
e.g., those who work and those who stay in school.  
 This may be a story of what social scientists call “selectivity”—those 
immigrants who the educational research literature finds to be high achievers are 
not those who are working (see Rumbaut 1997). Rather, there is a large group of 
“average-productivity” immigrant teens who choose to work and put in full time 
hours and a much smaller “highly select” group who chooses to stay in school, 
achieving high grades. Among the second generation, by contrast, schooling is 
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prevalent and the academic performance of “select” students is watered down by 
the average, while a smaller “less select or ambitious” group opts for work. If true, 
this would explain our findings of high unemployment among the second 
generation. Unemployment is relatively high among second-generation teens 
because in the labor force we only observe the behavior of the lower-skilled 
segment of that population. Those with average and above average skills are in 
school and not in the labor force. Unemployment among immigrant teens is more 
representative of the entire immigrant teen population because only the most 
skilled have opted to pursue schooling. Further research is needed to refine this line 
of analysis.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
     Generational analyses of Latinos must be sensitive to the very different age 
structures of the generations. Second generation Latinos are relatively young, 
whereas first-generation Latino adults are older. As a result, aggregate outcomes can 
be skewed by the different age mix of the generations. 
     Prime-age second-generation Latino adults outperform prime-age immigrant 
Latinos hands-down in the U.S. labor market. They are considerably better educated 
and are educated in U.S. schools. They are more literate and their knowledge is 
rewarded by employers. For example in 2000, the typical prime-age Mexican origin 
second-generation worker earned $480 per week, compared with a first-generation 
counterpart who earned $320 per week, a 50 percent wage differential. 
      Labor market outcomes are reversed for 16-to-19 year olds. Foreign-born Latino 
teens who are new arrivals in the U.S. are the highest paid teens in the labor market 
in terms of weekly earnings. The average first-generation 16-to-19 year old is paid 
$260 per week, significantly outpacing the $180 per week paid to second-generation 
teens and the $150 per week paid to white and African American teens. Mexican 
origin first-generation teen unemployment averaged nearly 11 percent in 2000, 
close to the 10.6 percent unemployment of whites and far below the 22 percent 
unemployment of second-generation Mexican teens and the 24 percent 
unemployment of African American teens. 
      The labor market success of foreign-born Latino teens is likely short-lived. 
Pursuit of a “work only” trajectory often precludes investment in schooling. The 
proportion of first- generation Latino 16-to-19 year olds pursuing schooling 
approaches 1-in-5. That is far below the 7-in-10 characteristic of second-generation 
Latino teens and white teens. The lack of formal U.S. schooling leaves most first-
generation teens unprepared for the U.S. labor market. Their lifetime wage profile is 
flat and by prime-age, their second-generation counterparts have eclipsed them 
substantially in earnings. 
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     While it is very well known that Latino immigrants on average face difficult 
prospects in the U.S. labor market, some evidence suggests that Latino immigrants 
who arrived in the U.S. during childhood might enjoy substantially brighter 
prospects. Some schooling outcomes for the 1.5 generation or “near natives” reveal 
that foreign-born Latino children fare as well as or better than second-generation 
Latino children in U.S. schools. Although further research is needed, the labor 
market outcomes of the Latino 1.5 generation reveal that a less sanguine assessment 
is in order. Prime-age foreign-born Latinos who came to the U.S. during childhood 
do not fare as well as similar second generation Latinos, let alone whites, in the U.S. 
labor market. Their educational attainment is lower and they are paid less. Arrival 
in the U.S. during childhood does not assure labor market success for immigrant 
offspring.  
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
We utilize the 1995 and 2000 Current Population Survey “Labor Extract Files” 
provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The outgoing 
rotation group of a monthly CPS has demographic and detailed labor force and 
earnings information for approximately 30,000 individuals. The NBER merged 
outgoing rotation group files concatenate into one file information from the twelve 
outgoing rotation groups of each calendar year. Since each outgoing rotation group 
is about a quarter of the monthly CPS sample, an annual merged outgoing rotation 
group file has the sample size of approximately 3 monthly CPSs combined. 
Although CPS respondents are in an “outgoing rotation group” twice during their 
participation in the CPS, they are never in an outgoing rotation group twice in the 
same calendar year. Hence, no individuals are “double-counted” in an annual NBER 
labor extract file. 
The NBER files include only persons 16 years and older. Child respondents are 
not included. Each year’s file has information on 275,000 to 325,000 adults. The 
CPS is designed to be representative of the noninstitutionalized, civilian 
population. The NBER produces merged outgoing rotation group files dating back 
to 1979. The CPS only began asking about respondents’ nativity and parents’ 
nativity on a regular basis since January 1994. Thus, the NBER Labor Extract Files 
have only become a rich, useful source of information on the labor market and 
educational outcomes by generation since 1994. Self-employed individuals are 
included in the CPS sample. However, NBER strongly advises researchers not to use 
any earnings information that may be present for self-employed workers. Thus, our 
median weekly earnings tabulations exclude the self-employed. 
Because of the size of the monthly CPS sample, it is difficult to perform 
generational analyses for Latinos using a monthly CPS sample. An annual NBER 
Labor Extract file is effectively the sample size of 3 monthly CPSs. The NBER Labor 
Extract sample sizes are large enough to perform generational analyses for Hispanic 
origin groups other than Mexicans. Appendix Table A reports the unweighted 
sample sizes by age and origin group for Latino labor force participants. The CPS 
question on Hispanic origin does identify Latinos of Cuban origin separately 
However, the sample sizes on Cubans in a Labor Extract file are sufficiently small to 
preclude a detailed generational analysis by age for Cubans.4 
 
                                                 
4 Zavodny (2001) examines outcomes for Cuban immigrants using the CPS. She merges 6 March CPS files 
(1994 to 2000) to derive a sample sufficiently large enough to examine Cuban outcomes. 
Table A1. Unweighted Sample Sizes for 16-66 Year-old Hispanic Labor Force Participants
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages 16 - 66 14,601 6,216 1,777 3,055 3,553 18,196 7,718 2,583 3,401 4,494
16 - 19 1,058 134 213 405 306 1,221 156 275 413 377
20 - 24 2,069 609 384 566 510 2,552 686 571 687 608
25 - 44 8,443 3,847 1,008 1,586 2,002 10,503 4,810 1,436 1,774 2,483
45 - 66 3,031 1,626 172 498 735 3,920 2,066 301 527 1,026
Mexicans
Ages 16 - 66 8,398 3,264 860 1,744 2,530 11,281 4,485 1,419 2,072 3,305
16 - 19 649 87 105 234 223 858 124 172 277 285
20 - 24 1,312 394 236 309 373 1,742 493 342 455 452
25 - 44 4,890 2,137 471 847 1,435 6,475 2,899 815 945 1,816
45 - 66 1,547 646 48 354 499 2,206 969 90 395 752
Central/South Americans
Ages 16 - 66 2,498 1,835 325 260 78 3,039 2,093 503 308 135
16 - 19 149 30 60 53 6 139 24 56 48 11
20 - 24 330 167 83 72 8 372 139 140 69 24
25 - 44 1,510 1,163 170 126 51 1,824 1,305 278 165 76
45 - 66 509 475 12 9 13 704 625 29 26 24
Puerto Ricans
Ages 16 - 66 1,611 429 313 713 156 1,649 373 342 666 268
16 - 19 128 11 30 67 20 108 7 26 42 33
20 - 24 184 18 31 112 23 208 20 43 98 47
25 - 44 926 220 164 451 91 970 205 153 455 157
45 - 66 373 180 88 83 22 363 141 120 71 31
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation Generation
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL DATA TABLES 
Table B1. Labor Market and Educational Outcomes, 1995 and 2000 
labor force high school
median employment unemployment participation noncompletion some college
weekly earnings to population rate rate rate or more
(in 2000 $) ratio (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Ages 16 - 66
All Latinos 337 360 63 69 9.3 5.7 69.8 72.9 45.9 44.4 27.5 28.1
NonHispanic Blacks 384 423 62 66 10.4 7.7 69.5 71.7 25.2 22.2 39.8 42.7
NonHispanic Whites 496 541 74 75 4.5 3.2 77.7 77.8 14.0 12.8 53.0 55.6
Ages 16 - 19
All Latinos 168 203 35 38 24.2 15.9 46.6 45.7 74.1 74.3 9.2 9.8
NonHispanic Blacks 124 150 26 30 35.9 23.9 40.0 38.9 73.9 71.0 8.2 10.6
NonHispanic Whites 124 147 51 52 13.3 10.6 58.7 57.7 65.6 65.5 15.0 15.3
Ages 20 - 24
All Latinos 269 301 64 72 11.2 7.9 71.9 78.1 39.5 38.4 31.4 28.4
NonHispanic Blacks 263 310 56 61 17.9 15.3 68.6 71.7 17.6 17.2 44.5 43.5
NonHispanic Whites 301 340 74 76 7.1 5.4 79.9 80.4 8.8 8.6 60.4 60.9
Ages 25 - 44
All Latinos 366 400 72 77 7.8 4.7 78.1 80.4 38.7 38.5 31.8 32.2
NonHispanic Blacks 410 461 72 78 8.7 6.2 80.2 83.0 13.9 11.9 47.7 50.6
NonHispanic Whites 543 600 82 84 3.8 2.6 86.1 86.1 7.3 6.7 59.1 61.3
Ages 45 - 66
All Latinos 375 402 56 64 6.8 3.9 60.6 67.0 52.8 46.1 23.9 27.8
NonHispanic Blacks 449 480 59 63 4.1 3.9 62.0 65.6 30.3 23.0 35.6 41.5
NonHispanic Whites 593 634 68 70 3.0 2.2 69.8 71.8 13.3 9.6 51.0 56.4
Source: Current Population Survey 
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Table B2. Median Weekly Earnings of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in 2000 dollars)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 337 309 337 366 393 360 329 360 400 420
16 - 19 168 225 168 139 154 203 260 209 180 180
20 - 24 269 255 269 269 281 301 290 320 320 320
25 - 44 366 314 421 482 453 400 340 400 500 480
45 - 66 375 337 505 419 449 402 350 540 489 500
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 314 281 309 359 382 350 320 325 384 400
16 - 19 172 225 168 140 166 209 260 230 195 180
20 - 24 263 247 247 269 269 300 290 300 320 312
25 - 44 349 294 348 464 449 382 323 375 480 467
45 - 66 350 286 450 391 422 400 320 506 480 485
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 337 323 345 337 449 369 360 380 415 480
20 - 24 269 269 292 236 320 300 320 360
25 - 44 359 337 505 539 505 398 360 456 550 560
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 421 404 419 421 463 423 400 400 450 425
25 - 44 449 421 449 505 539 463 400 440 500 520
45 - 66 451 427 518 481 450 400 462 554
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation Generation
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Table B3. Employment-to-population Ratios of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in percent)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 63 62 62 61 67 69 69 68 66 70
16 - 19 35 48 33 32 37 38 50 38 34 40
20 - 24 64 61 62 64 68 72 71 72 73 71
25 - 44 72 68 75 75 76 77 74 78 80 79
45 - 66 56 53 61 58 62 64 62 66 65 69
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 63 63 61 61 67 69 69 68 66 70
16 - 19 36 56 33 32 36 40 57 40 35 40
20 - 24 65 60 63 66 70 73 70 74 76 72
25 - 44 72 68 72 76 75 76 72 78 79 78
45 - 66 56 53 56 55 62 66 63 62 66 69
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 68 68 66 63 80 71 73 66 64 67
20 - 24 65 66 63 65 70 75 70 64
25 - 44 75 72 84 86 82 79 77 82 83 81
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 54 43 56 60 60 65 58 65 68 67
25 - 44 65 52 67 69 76 76 74 72 77 80
45 - 66 47 35 61 68 54 45 64 61
Source: Current Population Survey 
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Table B4. Unemployment Rates of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in percent)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 9.3 9.2 9.6 10.6 7.9 5.7 5.0 6.0 7.8 5.3
16 - 19 24.2 12.4 23.4 28.0 25.1 15.9 14.2 11.2 20.5 14.7
20 - 24 11.2 10.0 11.0 12.1 11.8 7.9 6.0 6.7 9.9 8.8
25 - 44 7.8 9.1 7.1 7.3 5.9 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.2 4.2
45 - 66 6.8 9.0 3.4 5.6 3.5 3.9 4.7 3.9 3.1 2.4
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 9.5 9.5 11.2 10.9 8.0 5.9 5.3 7.4 7.9 5.4
16 - 19 23.4 6.7 20.6 28.2 26.5 15.9 11.4 11.0 21.8 14.6
20 - 24 10.9 9.9 11.5 12.2 10.4 7.3 6.0 5.0 8.6 9.0
25 - 44 8.3 9.6 9.4 8.0 6.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 5.2 4.2
45 - 66 6.6 9.4 6.7 5.8 3.3 4.2 5.7 7.6 3.0 2.5
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 8.1 8.4 9.2 5.7 2.5 5.1 4.2 5.9 7.5 5.7
20 - 24 9.4 10.4 9.9 7.2 7.7 5.1 9.9 9.9
25 - 44 7.1 8.0 5.6 2.8 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.0 2.4
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 12.0 12.7 8.3 13.0 13.0 6.6 4.7 5.0 8.7 6.1
25 - 44 8.3 11.8 4.0 8.1 8.6 5.9 5.8 5.5 6.8 3.9
45 - 66 7.8 11.1 1.7 9.0 2.4 2.0 0.9 6.3
Source: Current Population Survey 
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Table B5. Labor Force Participation Rates of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in percent)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 69.6 68.7 68.9 68.2 72.8 72.9 73.1 72.2 71.7 74.0
16 - 19 46.5 54.4 42.4 44.4 49.9 45.7 58.7 43.0 43.3 46.8
20 - 24 71.6 68.3 70.0 72.3 76.8 78.1 76.0 76.7 81.3 78.4
25 - 44 77.8 74.7 80.4 80.6 80.8 80.4 77.7 82.6 84.1 82.3
45 - 66 60.6 58.5 63.5 61.0 64.7 67.0 65.3 68.7 66.6 70.4
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 70.0 69.6 68.6 68.1 72.4 72.9 73.2 72.2 71.3 73.8
16 - 19 46.8 59.8 41.2 44.5 48.4 47.2 64.1 44.9 44.7 46.6
20 - 24 72.8 67.1 71.7 75.6 77.9 78.6 74.8 78.1 83.3 78.8
25 - 44 78.1 74.9 79.7 82.3 80.1 79.3 76.1 81.7 83.5 81.4
45 - 66 60.2 58.2 60.1 58.3 64.6 68.4 66.8 67.1 67.9 71.2
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 73.6 74.5 72.3 66.5 81.9 74.6 76.5 71.3 69.2 71.3
20 - 24 72.2 73.9 70.2 70.4 75.6 79.6 76.5 71.0
25 - 44 80.7 78.8 89.1 88.0 85.0 81.8 80.2 86.2 86.5 83.2
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 61.2 48.7 61.2 69.2 68.8 69.3 60.6 68.2 74.7 71.7
25 - 44 70.8 59.2 70.2 75.3 82.6 80.7 78.3 77.3 82.1 83.0
45 - 66 51.0 39.2 62.1 74.4 55.2 45.5 64.4 64.7
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation Generation
 31
Table B6. Less than High School Completion Rates of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in percent)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 45.9 60.1 43.0 35.0 31.1 44.4 57.4 45.7 33.7 29.3
16 - 19 74.1 74.5 78.5 72.0 73.1 74.3 80.3 76.5 72.4 72.8
20 - 24 39.5 65.1 41.3 23.8 22.4 38.4 63.4 41.3 24.9 21.8
25 - 44 38.7 57.0 30.6 19.3 19.6 38.5 54.7 38.3 19.0 19.1
45 - 66 52.8 63.1 36.7 43.1 39.6 46.1 58.9 34.9 31.4 29.3
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 52.0 73.1 53.0 38.4 33.2 50.2 69.6 54.4 37.4 31.1
16 - 19 75.2 76.2 82.2 71.9 74.5 75.7 82.5 79.1 74.2 73.0
20 - 24 44.4 73.7 48.9 24.7 24.4 42.5 70.5 49.6 25.7 21.8
25 - 44 45.9 69.9 43.7 22.5 21.3 45.0 65.9 47.6 21.6 21.3
45 - 66 60.2 81.0 48.0 47.0 42.0 53.2 76.2 45.3 36.4 32.2
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 36.0 39.6 30.4 26.4 8.6 36.8 38.9 36.3 29.2 25.3
20 - 24 31.8 48.8 19.4 9.0 31.4 45.0 28.3 18.2 19.5
25 - 44 30.5 37.0 9.7 2.0 4.0 32.6 37.7 26.0 8.8 14.7
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 39.5 49.9 40.9 31.8 34.4 35.8 47.4 42.1 27.2 29.6
25 - 44 26.1 36.8 32.1 19.1 17.7 23.6 30.2 34.5 20.6 12.5
45 - 66 49.7 61.8 36.5 26.4 44.6 60.7 40.7 14.0 28.4
Source: Current Population Survey 
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Table B7. Some College or More Completion Rate of Latinos, 1995 and 2000 (in percent)
1995 2000
3rd and 3rd and
All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher All 1.0 1.5 2nd higher
All Latino origin groups
Ages
16 - 66 27.5 18.3 30.2 36.9 34.3 28.1 18.9 27.7 38.3 36.3
16 - 19 9.2 6.4 7.8 11.8 7.8 9.8 2.8 8.6 12.1 10.1
20 - 24 31.4 12.7 28.9 45.6 41.6 28.4 10.6 25.8 42.3 36.3
25 - 44 31.8 19.8 38.5 48.0 40.7 32.2 20.7 33.2 48.8 43.7
45 - 66 23.9 18.2 37.7 29.7 29.8 27.8 19.2 39.4 40.2 36.5
Mexicans
Ages
16 - 66 22.6 9.7 22.0 32.9 32.6 23.4 11.2 19.6 33.7 34.5
16 - 19 8.1 2.6 5.7 11.5 7.4 8.7 1.9 8.4 10.1 9.6
20 - 24 28.1 8.2 25.5 41.6 41.1 24.9 6.0 18.4 39.8 37.0
25 - 44 25.7 11.2 25.5 43.8 38.9 26.3 13.0 23.4 43.0 41.2
45 - 66 18.6 7.5 31.9 26.0 27.1 23.6 10.1 29.9 37.1 33.6
Central/South Americans
Ages
16 - 66 35.1 30.9 41.2 51.3 48.9 34.1 30.3 38.0 48.8 39.4
20 - 24 35.3 18.9 41.4 67.1 35.5 19.8 39.1 56.6
25 - 44 39.9 32.7 61.4 79.3 57.1 38.4 32.1 49.4 67.3 51.2
Puerto Ricans
Ages
16 - 66 30.8 24.5 26.2 37.1 35.3 35.0 27.1 30.0 43.1 34.7
25 - 44 39.8 34.8 27.8 45.2 49.9 44.6 42.0 36.5 47.9 46.9
45 - 66 23.9 15.4 32.5 42.3 28.7 15.1 32.5 53.4
Source: Current Population Survey 
Generation Generation
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